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about the author: bloodmandra is an explorer of military ideas, a lover of strategic and tactical research, a creator of war novels, and a model maker. he is more utilitarian than seeking honor.

the full text is divided into two chapters, this is the first chapter. this chapter has 3677 words and takes about fifteen minutes to read.

the war between han and hungary that lasted for hundreds of years was a highlight in the history of chinese wars. li guang, wei qing, huo qubing and many other shining generals emerged one after another. nowadays, people focus most of their attention on emperor wu’s offensive and counterattack against the xiongnu, or the siege of baideng and the "letter from chan yu to empress lu" of emperor gaozu, but they ignore the 40-year-long dynasty of emperor wen and emperor jing. lessons from the remaining years of life. it was precisely because of the strategies of the wen and jing dynasties of active defense externally and recuperation internally that the han empire was able to restrain foreign enemies, reduce losses, accumulate strength, and lay a solid foundation for the large-scale counterattack of the wu dynasty.

sweet spring beacon fire and yanmen smoke: the anti-hungarian war between emperor wen and emperor jing

in the early han dynasty, under the governance of maodun chanyu, the xiongnu country was flourishing. after maodun shanyu unified all the grassland tribes, he collected their camps and obtained 400,000 riders (the "book of han" believed it was more than 300,000). they were all "string-controllers" who were good at riding and shooting. han gaozu, who did not believe in evil, took chu and han after the victory, wei wei expedition, but fell into bai deng's trap. thanks to chen ping who came up with an "unheard of" trick and bribed shanyu's wife yan to let him know, the whole army was in a panic seven days later with bows and arrows drawn. escape. from then on, the fear of the xiongnu military power left a deep imprint in the hearts of the han empire's monarchs and ministers.

in the next twenty years or so, mao dun occasionally went to the fortress to "become a thief", and even half-jokingly suggested that he, an old widower, and empress lu, an old widow, couldn't make a pair of mandarin ducks. empress lu was furious, and fan kuai asked himself to lead an army of 100,000 to "run rampant among the xiongnu", but he was immediately ridiculed by ji bu: emperor gaozu had more than 400,000 troops (about 200,000 slow-moving infantry) in baideng, and they were trapped in a tight siege, let alone ten. ten thousand people? in the end, the fear of the xiongnu's military power forced queen lu to calm down, write a humble letter asking for peace, and maintain peace with the xiongnu by relying on her marriage and the annual coins (the xiongnu received a lot of wine, rice and food every year).

emperor wen succeeded to the throne and had just settled the affairs of the lu, maodun took advantage of the power of the west to destroy the yuezhi and invaded the south. the yueshi were originally a powerful country in the western regions. after suffering a devastating blow, they were forced to move westward. the xiongnu then set up child servant captains in the western regions to recruit manpower and material resources and squeeze war resources. in the summer of the third year of emperor wen's reign (177 bc), king youxian of the xiongnu went south and invaded shangjun (in today's yulin, shaanxi province). the xiongnu deployed their forces, with the royal court in the middle, facing south. king xian of the right was responsible for fighting in the northwest, and king xian of the left was responsible for fighting in shanxi and north china. emperor wen sent 80,000 chariots and cavalry to gaonu (in today's yan'an), and under the command of prime minister guan ying, he attacked king youxian. king youxian saw that the han army was well prepared and withdrew outside the wall. emperor wen's three-year invasion of the fortress was short and did not cause much damage. emperor wen was overjoyed to see that the xiongnu had been frightened away, and came from ganquan palace (in today's chunhua, shaanxi province) to the gaonu army.

the following year, mao dun sent a letter that was half threat and half apology. on the one hand, he put the responsibility for the invasion on "the han border officials invaded and insulted king youxian", and on the other hand, he threatened that "all the twenty-six countries in the western regions have "for the huns", he even used a lesson tone to ask emperor wen to "order the officials and the people to stay far away" and draw a military demarcation line on the border. enclosed with the letter were pitiful and insulting gifts: the chanyu gave the han emperor 1 camel and 2 horses.

emperor wen handed shan yu's letter to the court for discussion. the ministers unanimously said that the huns were "invincible" because of their strong military strength and "it would be very easy to make a marriage." emperor wen had no choice but to continue to implement the marriage and gave him much more valuable, rich and decent gifts. the gifts included 3 sets of gorgeous clothes, 3 pieces of expensive gold jewelry, and 110 pieces of high-grade fabrics, and he urged shan yu to abide by the contract. the unequal relationship between the monarchs of han and hungary is evident.

seemingly falling in love with the exquisite gifts given to him by emperor wen, modun shanyu never made any large-scale invasions again. after modun shanyu died in 174 bc, his son laoshang shanyu (also known as jizhou) succeeded to the throne. compared with mao dun, who is talented, broad-minded, profound and resourceful, the young and old shanyu is more energetic and courageous. he claimed to be "the great chanyu of the xiongnu who is the birthplace of heaven and earth and the moon" and called emperor wen the "emperor of the han dynasty". the confidence behind this was of course the "more than 300,000 string control men" his father left for him, but there was also more as a young man, he is eager to show his strength and talents. once this kind of impulsive, manic, and arrogant personality of the old shangyu is combined with the military practice of the xiongnu's new successors needing to use troops to boost their power, it will become a disaster for the central plains and han dynasty.

in the autumn of the fourteenth year of emperor wen's reign, the xiongnu invaded the fortress from chaona and xiaoguan (in present-day guyuan, ningxia), a county in northern han dynasty. the old shanyu personally led 140,000 cavalry, an unprecedented scale. beidi county was in a hurry, and the captain sun xian led his troops to resist. following the han system, border counties had little financial resources and only a few thousand soldiers. soon, sun xian died in battle. after defeating xiao pass, the xiongnu soldiers divided into two groups, plundered all the way, went south deep into the heart of the han empire, burned the li palace and returned to the central palace (in today's longxian county, shaanxi province), and the waiting cavalry (that is, the scout cavalry) even reached the han empire the palace, ganquan palace, is only a hundred miles away from chang'an!

although the xiongnu invaded the fortress urgently, the beacon system carefully operated by the han empire played an early warning role and bought time for emperor wen to deploy a counterattack. following the han system, beacon fires were arranged according to different conditions. depending on the enemy's situation, smoke would be used during the day or fires would be set off at night. each station would respond accordingly, and messages could be sent for more than 1,500 miles each day and night. with the excellent beacon system of the han empire, the news spread from the north to chang'an within a few days.

emperor wen immediately began to deploy defenses. he first recruited 10,000 troops from the three counties of beidi, shangjun, and longxi to the north, northwest, and west of chang'an. these county soldiers were less well-trained local troops serving as guards, but they were used for guarding. the huns should be able to do the job on their way back. emperor wen also recruited thousands of chariots and 100,000 cavalry as a mobile force. he wanted to go to conquer hu in person, but was dissuaded by the officials, so he deployed this mobile force in chang'an. zhang xiangru, marquis of dongyang, was appointed as the general, and many people were appointed as generals. he "sent out large numbers of chariots and cavalry to attack the hu", and the number of troops should not be less than 100,000. adding together the previous "100,000 cavalry", the number of troops used by the han army this time was no less than 20 more than ten thousand people.

han dynasty beacon ruins. in the han system, each fusillade guard ranged from three to five to twenty or thirty people.

emperor wen's military strategy was similar to "closing the door and beating the dogs": the huns had penetrated deep into guanzhong and were harassing them everywhere, so they used the three border counties to block the huns' return, and also recruited powerful mobile troops mainly composed of chariots and cavalry to carry out the hunt and annihilation, in order to destroy the huns in guanzhong. within. however, the reality is that the han army "cannot kill anyone". the huge chariot troops may be afraid of battle (the painful memory of baideng siege has not been erased), or due to lack of mobility (the heavier chariots are in the mountains) the area was inconvenient to move), and he was never able to engage in battle with the old top dan yu 140,000 fine cavalry.

the chase lasted for more than a month. the xiongnu elite cavalry plundered the pass, loaded up their animals and carried their people, and left the fortress. the han army did not pursue them, and they seemed to be escorting them out of the country. perhaps due to guilt, shame and anger, dongyang hou zhang xiangru passed away the next year. dongyang hou was a veteran who had served the imperial court since the time of emperor gaozu. in "historical records·zhang shizhi feng tang biography", emperor wen called him the "elder", second only to jianghou zhou bo. it can be seen that he was an experienced and capable person. there are many loyal elders who lack the wisdom and courage, but they have to shoulder the heavy responsibility of leading the army and challenge a tough and aggressive leader like the old shang shanyu. they may be inhumane for emperor wen.

when emperor wen complained to the down-on-his-luck petty official feng tang that he could not obtain famous generals such as lian po and li mu, feng tang's assessment was spot on: even if emperor wen could obtain lian po and li mu, he could not reuse them! ten centuries later, wang yucheng, a political commentator of the song dynasty, praised emperor wen for his good use of people and profound virtues in "ten strategies for controlling the rong" (for example, when the military officials were strong, they appointed people externally and cultivated politics internally, so that they could not do anything for them). deep patient, by hu deye) is also a whitewashed political argument, which is difficult to take seriously.

later, emperor wen ordered feng tang chijie to pardon wei shang, the prefect of yunzhong, and promote him as a "talent". 11 centuries later, su shi's "jiang chengzi" made feng tang's reputation as a messenger of good news forever passed down to future generations: "in the clouds of holding the festival, when will feng tang be sent!" of course, neither feng tang nor su shi himself waited in the end. come to your own good news.

in the battle to drive out the huns in the 14th year of emperor wen's reign, although the han army had a large number of troops, it failed to achieve anything. it was just a waste of military power. although there were reasons such as zhang xiangru being too cautious in using troops and the huns army being too strong, the main reason was that the han army's troop distribution the ratio and tactics are not yet mature, which seriously affects the overall combat effectiveness. at this time, the han army still had a considerable number of chariots and soldiers, who were often referred to as chariots and cavalry. in chinese chariots, one person controls the horse, one wields the weapon for close combat, and the other holds the bow for long-range shooting. they are as fast as flying. if the chariots are lined up, they can charge back and forth on the plains with no disadvantages. however, their biggest weakness lies in their poor terrain adaptability and survivability. the target of the chariot is large, and it cannot move in the mountains. once it encounters an obstacle or the horse is shot and loses balance, the vehicle will be destroyed and everyone will die. in the battle of dayuan during the spring and autumn period, faced with the rugged taihang mountains and the barbarians raging in the mountains, wei shu of the jin state first "destroyed his chariots" and used his chariots and soldiers to dismount and fight on foot, and then he defeated the barbarian infantry in the mountains.

ancient chariots were driven by two or four horses, and had three warriors. the driver was in the middle, one held a spear, and the other held a bow and arrow. however, they were not good at fighting in complex terrain.

the han army was still using chariots on the edge of the mountainous guanzhong basin, and its tactical mobility was conceivable, so it was not surprising that it was unable to catch up with the light cavalry of the shanyu. it was not until the reign of emperor wu that the han army truly established cavalry as a strategic service, and it was not until then that the organized chariot troops as a mobile attack force withdrew from the stage of history.

after emperor wen entered the fortress in the 14th year, his elder shanyu made peace with the han empire. soon, his son, the military minister shanyu, succeeded to the throne. compared with the old shang shanyu who conquered the western regions to destroy the dayue clan (and made the skull of the king of the dayue clan into a wine cup), and went south to the han dynasty to invade the ganquan palace, the military minister chanyu is more like his ancestor maodun and pays more attention to economic development. predation and political suppression are used to expand strength, and military strikes are only used as auxiliary means of foreign strategy. therefore, the military minister chanyu made a slight change to the han dynasty.

in the last years of emperor wen and the dynasty of emperor jing, the military minister chanyu only launched three localized invasions, none of which were as large as the large-scale invasion of lao shang chanyu in the 14th year of emperor wen. however, he obtained a much richer economy than lao shang chanyu. harvest. the amount of annual coins increased greatly, and the emperor of the han dynasty was forced to "treat them generously" many times, including cloth, silk, grain, distiller's yeast, fine wine, and gold coins (the remaining items were numerous, including gold, silk, and catkins). compared with the early han dynasty, in the era of emperor gaozu, cash was added to the food and cloth for the first time. it also forced the han dynasty to send clan girls north to marry the xiongnu four times, transforming military advantages into political and economic advantages.

the military minister shanyu's three invasions in the wen and jing dynasties also caused considerable losses to the han empire. among them, in the sixth year of emperor wen's reign (158 bc), the xiongnu entered the fortress with 60,000 horses. emperor wen quickly dispatched zhou yafu to guard xiliu. the famous story of "zhou yafu's army at xiliu" happened at this time, although zhou yafu was strict in his military management. , but did not fight the huns. after that, the military minister chanyu entered the fortress twice more during the reign of emperor jing. first, in the sixth year of emperor jing's reign (144 bc), he broke into yanmen and shangjun and seized the royal horses from the royal horse farm. more than 2,000 han guards died in the battle. later, in the spring of the second year of houyuan (142 bc), he entered yanmen again and killed feng jing, the prefect of yanmen and the former imperial censor.

previously, yanmen (today's dai county, shanxi province) had been the first line of defense against the huns on the northern border of the han empire. it was known as an important border town. under the leadership of its former governor, the cool official zhidu known as "goshawk", it was stable. fortress, the xiongnu never dared to invade, and everyone died because of the political struggle. the xiongnu immediately invaded, and his successor feng jing became the highest-ranking victim in the han-hungarian war - under the system of the early han dynasty, the imperial censor was the prime minister. his deputy and successor discuss military affairs with the prime minister. together with the prime minister, he is called the "second palace", and his status is respected as such. as soon as emperor jing's war against the huns came to an end, he ended it imperfectly with the blood of feng jing, the former imperial censor and prefect of yanmen.