"revisiting the road to chongqing's liberation" · military ①｜planning and strategizing, swinging the sword westward and sweeping away thousands of troops
2024-09-18
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▲the southwest service group passed through youyang and nanchuan, and marched day and night to chongqing. (photo provided by the party history research office of the chongqing municipal committee of the communist party of china)
▲on august 11, at guangzhou haizhu national wetland park, marshal liu bocheng's second son liu meng presented a handwritten couplet to a reporter from new chongqing-chongqing daily.
carved eaves, wok-ear gables, flying pavilions and red flowing water... on august 11, a short period of heavy rain extinguished the summer heat in guangzhou. walking into the guangzhou haizhu national wetland park, the new chongqing-chongqing daily reporter met with general liu meng here.
"thank you for your hard work. you came all the way here to interview me." although he is in his seventies, the old general still has bright eyes and is in good spirits. his voice is loud and clear, occasionally tinged with kaizhou accent. his every move reveals his true soldier character.
"looking horizontally and vertically, entering history and understanding life with an open mind" - our interview "retracing the road to the liberation of chongqing" began with this handwritten couplet given to reporters by general liu meng.
chairman mao called on the troops, and liu and deng's army was ordered to march westward
general liu's couplet is written with vigorous brushstrokes, majestic momentum, and every word is exquisite.
"looking horizontally and vertically" shows his adherence to the grand historical view based on the marxist principle of integrity as its theoretical basis; "understanding life" shows his life creed of "reading history to gain wisdom, and learning from the past to know the future."
this also perfectly fits with the original intention of chongqing daily to launch the "retracing the road to chongqing's liberation" series of reports.
"the liberation of chongqing must start with chairman mao zedong's move to the southwest." after presenting the couplet, general liu took out the script of his recently created large-scale historical film "zhongshan storm" from his bag and showed the reporter a scene from the script:
liu bocheng said to his adjutant: you give this list of weapons and equipment for the march into the southwest to wang yecheng. he is still working overtime at the jinling arsenal. ask him to finish it as soon as possible.
zhang eryong (liu bocheng’s adjutant): yes (zhang turned around and prepared to go out, then turned his head back).
zhang eryong: it's raining outside. i'm worried about your legs. they hurt when it rains. comrade ronghua and i want to buy some medicine for you... (liu bocheng interrupts zhang eryong)
liu bocheng: this minor illness will not hinder our advance into the southwest. go and deliver the information quickly.
zhang eryong (standing at attention, saluting): yes, the southwest has been liberated, and i am going home with the commander...
this wonderful scene in the script vividly tells the scene of liu bocheng "bidding farewell to sun yat-sen mausoleum and preparing to march into the southwest to fulfill his lifelong wish."
liu meng, the second son of liu bocheng, graduated from tsinghua university. he has engaged in scientific research, served as a troop commander, military diplomat, united nations military observer, and held the rank of major general. he also participated in the writing of "biography of liu bocheng" and created the film literary script "young liu bocheng", etc. he has a clear understanding of that period of history.
looking back on the past, traveling through time and space.
in late april 1949, mao zedong had just finished his breakfast and was taking a nap in the pavilion at shuangqing villa in xiangshan, beiping, when his secretary excitedly brought him the news of the liberation of nanjing.
after reading the good news, mao zedong returned to the house and walked to the huge map hanging on the wall. his eyes extended from nanjing to south china, southwest china and northwest china, his brows sometimes frowned and sometimes relaxed.
soon, zhou enlai also walked into the room. mao zedong said: "it was originally planned that the second field army would stay in east china for two years and not make any new maneuvers to prevent possible interference by us imperialism after our army crossed the river. now it seems that the possibility of direct us intervention is not great, and the second field army's next move to the southwest should be put on the agenda." [excerpt from guo juanjuan's "records of chongqing liberation", originally published in "overview of party history" no. 8, 2019]
on may 23, 1949, the central military commission made arrangements for marching across the country, clearly stating: "the second field army should also be prepared to march westward with its main force or the entire army in two months to manage sichuan, guizhou, and kang." the deployment also pointed out that it was necessary for the second field army to assist the third field army in dealing with possible u.s. military intervention, so that the united states would be afraid and dare not send troops. however, after shanghai, ningbo, fuzhou and other places were occupied by our army, the possibility of u.s. military intervention would be very small, and then the second field army could march westward.
"giving the task of marching into the southwest to the second field army showed mao zedong's favor for this heroic unit." liu meng said that at that time, the second field army had three corps and nine armies under its command, which was very strong. mao zedong had great trust in the battle-hardened second field army leadership composed of liu bocheng, deng xiaoping, zhang jichun, li da and others.
on june 17 of the same year, the central military commission again telegraphed liu bocheng and deng xiaoping: "september is a more suitable time for the second field army to move westward. first, there is plenty of time for preparation; second, food will be available along the way at that time; third, the main force of the fourth field army (7 armies) can reach chenzhou in september and may occupy guangzhou in november, forcing the guangzhou puppet government to move to chongqing, and then it will be more advantageous to fight for chongqing." [originally published in "selected documents of the cpc central committee" compiled by the central archives (volume 18)]
in accordance with the instructions of the party central committee, the second field army, which had just been baptized by the battle of crossing the yangtze river, began to plan its march into the southwest without stopping. in mid-july 1949, after comprehensively analyzing the enemy situation, the second field army commander liu bocheng, political commissar deng xiaoping and the second field army front committee convened a meeting of senior cadres of the second field army in nanjing to study and formulate the operational policy for the march into the southwest.
the best strategy is to attack the enemy's plan and "make a detour" to gather the enemy and annihilate them
the southwest region, especially the northeastern and southeastern regions of chongqing, has high mountains, dense forests, and ravines, and has always been a strategic location that military strategists must fight for. so, how did the second field army deploy its troops when marching into the southwest?
in the office of zhou yong, former executive deputy director of the propaganda department of the chongqing municipal party committee, honorary president of the chongqing history research association, and famous cultural and historical expert, he opened a collection of archives on the liberation of chongqing.
"chongqing and the southwest are difficult to fight, and chiang kai-shek naturally knows this." he said that in chiang kai-shek's view, the southwest has political and geographical conditions that can be defended. for this reason, the kuomintang established an extraordinary committee and passed the "reversal plan". chiang kai-shek came out again and flew to chongqing on august 24, 1949, determined to make the final resistance in the southwest. he immediately proposed to use yunnan, guizhou, sichuan and kang as the rear base, "build the capital" in chongqing, and "secure the southwest", waiting for international events in order to make a comeback.
in terms of combat, chiang kai-shek carefully constructed the "great southwest defense line" with chongqing as the command center, sichuan as the main stronghold, the sichuan-shaanxi border as the defense focus, and gansu and shaanxi as the decisive battle zone. the total force reached more than 900,000 people. he attempted to use the direct hu zongnan group and others to hold the qinling mountains and other natural barriers to prevent the people's liberation army from entering sichuan; he organized the hunan-guangdong joint defense with the bai chongxi group and others, relying on guangdong and guangxi as a cover to defend the southwest. if guangdong was not protected, bai's troops retreated to guangxi, echoed with sichuan hu zongnan's troops, contacted the yunnan and guizhou warlords to resist together, and waited for the opportunity. after such a deployment, chiang kai-shek proudly proposed "military southwest, political taiwan."
"chiang kai-shek used his direct subordinate hu zongnan's group to control the natural barrier of qinling mountains to prevent our people's liberation army from entering sichuan from here. the main reason was that northern sichuan was a shortcut for the people's liberation army to enter sichuan, and the longhai railway was connected to the old liberated areas, so the supply problem was relatively easy to solve." liu meng said, therefore, chiang kai-shek's kuomintang judged that the main force of our army was most likely to enter sichuan from this direction (our underground party organization reinforced the enemy's misjudgment through secret relationships).
how did the people's liberation army respond to chiang kai-shek's deployment?
opening a yellowed "situation map of the march into the southwest", zhou yong said that from the situation map, one can clearly see our army's classic layout of "surround three and leave one", which includes both real and fake.
on july 14, 1949, deng xiaoping was ordered to attend the central working conference in peiping (now beijing) for the first time. together with mao zedong and other central leaders, he planned the battle deployment for the second field army and other troops to march into the southwest.
mao zedong, deng xiaoping and others decided that liu and deng would have a total of 500,000 troops, except for the four armies led by chen geng, and their main force would enter sichuan via western hunan, western hubei and northern guizhou in september. he long would lead about 100,000 troops to enter chengdu. comrades liu, deng and he would form the southwest bureau to manage the four provinces of sichuan, yunnan, guizhou and kang. when fighting against bai chongxi and the enemies in the southwestern provinces, they would adopt a strategic policy of large-scale detours, penetrate behind the enemy, first complete the encirclement, and then fight back.
in accordance with the instructions of the party central committee, in order to completely cut off the enemy's retreat and block the enemy in the southwest to annihilate it completely, liu bocheng, deng xiaoping, zhang jichun, li da and others, after repeated research, drafted the "basic order for the sichuan-guizhou march" on august 19, 1949, submitted it to the military commission and informed the central china bureau.
the order clearly defined the basic tasks of each unit, namely, "to capture guiyang and southeastern sichuan, to attack the enemy in yibin, luxian, and jiangjin in a large-scale roundabout way, and to control the areas to the north of the above-mentioned areas, so that song xilian, sun zhen (then the director of the sichuan-hunan-hubei border region and the sichuan-hubei border region pacification office of the kuomintang army, respectively) and the enemy in chongqing and other places will be completely isolated in eastern sichuan, and then these enemies will be annihilated or resolved by political means, so as to cooperate with our army in northern sichuan to gradually resolve the problems of the whole sichuan." [originally published in the central archives, "selected documents of the cpc central committee" (volume 18)]
at the same time, the order deployed the actions of various troops: the first step for the 5th and 3rd corps was to reach the wugang, shaoyang, xiangtan line and the changde, jiangling line respectively before october 10; the second step was to capture guiyang, qianxi and zunyi, pengshui, qianjiang respectively before november 20; the third step was to pass through bijie to attack the enemy in the yibin to naxi area and the luxian to jiangjin area respectively.
"it can be seen that this deployment completely avoided the defensive focus of the hu zongnan group and the bai chongxi group, and started from southeastern sichuan, the weakest part of chiang kai-shek's so-called 'greater southwest defense line'," said liu meng.
in accordance with the military strategic policy of "large-scale detour, large-scale encirclement, and large-scale annihilation", the party central committee decided that he long would lead the 18th corps from southern shaanxi province into sichuan to cooperate with the main force of the second field army to liberate the southwest, but "the time for the annihilation of hu should not be too early. we should wait until the second field army advances to the line of xu, lu, and chongqing, and then launch an attack, roughly in mid-december"; the fourth field army would march towards guangxi, use a large-scale detour to cut off bai chongxi's group's retreat to yunnan, and prevent it from "securing the left and right rivers, reinforcing guizhou province, shielding kunming, and supporting lei and qiong."
in addition to military preparations, the second field army also made sufficient ideological preparations and began to rest and recuperate in july. at that time, some officers and soldiers were afraid of difficulties and hardships and had conservative ideas. they believed that the southwest was remote, mountainous, long, barren, and poor, and they were afraid that they would not be able to return home.
to this end, deng xiaoping chaired a meeting of the front committee and decided to carry out political education while mobilizing for the march, in order to strengthen the national consciousness of the people and the motherland, cherish the people and the motherland's property, oppose parochialism, and oppose complaining and self-righteousness. the second field army also held a party representative meeting in a timely manner to review and put forward suggestions to resolve the fear of difficulties from the ideological level.
moreover, liu bocheng believed that "a force without culture cannot complete the task of liberating the southwest assigned by the central government." the second field army selected more than 4,800 local cadres to work in the southwest, recruited about 10,000 young students in beijing and shanghai, formed a southwest service group, did mass work in the liberation of the southwest, and assisted in the construction of the southwest. thus, the second field army completed all pre-war preparations for the march to the southwest.
making a feint to the east and attacking in the west, using military tactics like a god to sweep away thousands of troops
after attending the founding ceremony and subsequent related meetings, liu bocheng took a train from beijing to the south with deng xiaoping on october 23 to meet with the second field army leadership led by zhang jichun and li dazhao who were heading north from nanjing. when he arrived in zhengzhou, he attended a grand and warm welcome meeting held by people from all walks of life, made public appearances and delivered a speech. the xinhua news agency also broadcast the news specifically for this.
"this was actually their clever use of the tactic of making a feint to the east and attacking in the west to confuse the enemy. the purpose was to transfer chiang kai-shek's defensive troops in eastern sichuan and eastern guizhou to the north as much as possible, so as to achieve the suddenness of the second field army's main force launching a frontal attack in this area. mao zedong once succinctly summarized liu and deng's brilliant plan: liu and deng 'went from beijing to hunan via wuhan and commanded the second field army to march towards sichuan'. the third and fifth corps replenished their cotton clothes and 'advanced to the hunan-guizhou border to wait for orders'," said liu meng.
however, just as chiang kai-shek was feeling proud of moving his main force to northern sichuan to implement key defense, the main force of the second field army had secretly moved to changde and shaoyang in western hunan to quickly assemble. after leaving zhengzhou, the leadership of the second field army did not move westward, but secretly moved southward and arrived in wuhan.
at this time, on the qinling line connecting the southwest and northwest, the people's liberation army's 18th corps and hu zongnan's group were "easily" confronting each other. on the one hand, they were advancing slowly and could not break through, while on the other hand, they were hesitant about whether to defend or retreat.
on the vast battlefield south of the yangtze river, the second and fourth field armies formed a strange contrast: the fourth field army, which openly marched towards south china, was mighty and powerful with drums and gongs; the second field army, which secretly marched towards the southwest, lay down its flags and disappeared without a trace. however, one combat order after another was quietly conveyed to the commanders of the participating troops and immediately turned into resolute actions of the officers and fighters.
in this way, the liberation of the southwest suddenly began under the careful planning of our command:
on november 1, 1949, while the fourth field army launched the guangxi campaign, liu and deng commanded the main forces of the second field army to suddenly launch a multi-pronged attack on the enemy in an area about 500 kilometers wide, from badong, hubei in the north to tianzhu, guizhou in the south, immediately disrupting chiang kai-shek's entire defensive deployment in the southwest. among them, the enemy in southeastern sichuan attempted to redeploy defenses to ensure the safety of the main forces of the southwest enemy. the various units of our army overcame all difficulties and accelerated their advance, not only smashing the kuomintang army's "sichuan, hunan and hubei border defense line", but also cutting off its southwest defense line in half, breaking bai chongxi's attempt to retreat westward to yunnan and guizhou, and directly threatening the retreat of hu zongnan's troops in northern sichuan.
at this point, chiang kai-shek finally woke up from his dream, and felt that "the situation in sichuan and guizhou was becoming increasingly serious, and a catastrophe was imminent." in the early morning of november 30, 1949, chiang kai-shek fled to chengdu after spending a frightened night on a special plane at baishiyi airport.
on the same day, the vanguard of the people's liberation army entered the urban area of chongqing, and the urban area of chongqing was declared liberated. the dawn broke in the mountain city, and history turned a new page - from this day on, the people of chongqing, under the leadership of the communist party of china, overthrew the reactionary rule of the kuomintang, bid farewell to suffering, and embarked on the road of building a new socialist china and a new chongqing.
"there are many cases where the people's liberation army defeated the larger force with the smaller one, but the battles to liberate the southwest and chongqing are classic cases in chinese military history and even in world military history. today, looking back on this period of history, its rich historical connotations still have value that transcends time and space. we must carry forward the spirit of our ancestors to 'flatten the bumps on the road and set off again after overcoming the difficulties', read history wisely, practice real skills and real kung fu, and contribute to the advancement of the cause of socialism with chinese characteristics to cut through the waves and forge ahead." at the end of the interview, liu meng left a message to readers.
