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editor’s note:on september 23, the ministry of state security issued a document to expose the "taiwan independence" cyber army "anonymous 64": since the beginning of this year, a hacker group called "anonymous 64" has frequently launched cyber attacks against mainland china and hong kong and macao, attempting to obtain control rights to relevant portal websites, outdoor electronic screens, and online televisions, and then illegally upload and insert content that denigrates the mainland's political system and major policies, reverses right and wrong, and spreads rumors. in response, the national security agency took immediate action and took effective measures to deal with potential hazards and eliminate adverse effects. in-depth investigations confirmed that the "anonymous 64" organization is not an ordinary hacker, but a cyber army nurtured by the "taiwan independence" forces.

for a long time, the dpp has nurtured various types of "cyber armies" to launch cyber attacks and infiltrations, posing a certain threat to mainland china's online public opinion and national security, and also causing harassment to netizens on both sides of the taiwan strait and taiwan's pro-unification opinion leaders.

in response to this issue, observer.com connected with mr. wang bingzhong, a well-known young political commentator in taiwan, and asked him to talk about the harm of the "taiwan independence cyber army" to both sides of the taiwan strait based on his personal experience.

【text/observer.com tang xiaofu】

guancha.com: you have also been attacked by many cyber troops from the democratic progressive party for a long time. can you please talk about your experience of fighting with the taiwanese cyber troops? what are their characteristics?

wang bingzhong:let me give you an example. my high school classmate lin weifeng was exposed by the news about two or three years ago for having long been a mainland internet soldier, stirring up trouble on taiwan's social networking platforms.

lin weifeng was originally an editor of a green media, and later became an editor of a "taiwan independence" new media called "eyeball cctv". his wife is a party worker of the democratic progressive party. the couple worked together and played the role of cross-dressers for a long time, dressing themselves up as mainland netizens and deliberately using extremely popular remarks on the island's internet to attack people and things in taiwan. the purpose was to create the effect of the so-called "chinese communist party passers-by" infiltrating taiwan's websites. later, it was exposed that they were actually directing and acting by themselves.

this is their first characteristic: they will not let you see directly that they are from taiwan, or from the "taiwan independence" forces, but instead they disguise themselves as mainland netizens and fight you with tactics similar to "carrying a red flag to oppose the red flag". from this you know that the "taiwan independence" forces are very good at mobilizing cyber armies.

the second characteristic is that they will use extreme left or extreme right arguments and, under the guise of patriotism, attack the true patriotic and unified forces, which is what we call "low-level red and high-level black."

based on my past experience, taiwan's cyber army has several characteristics in its actions:

first, they deliberately set national reunification and national rejuvenation against each other. for example, they emphasize that the current economic development situation is not good, and reunification will disrupt the overall economic development and hinder the development and progress of the motherland.

this has a particularly big impact on pro-unification people like us on the island, because we are eager to promote unification and are persecuted by "taiwan independence" on the front line in taiwan, so we naturally emphasize that unification cannot be delayed and must be achieved as soon as possible. then there will be a lot of cyber troops who will attack the pro-unification people for ignoring the overall situation, sowing discord, and saying that unification conflicts with the development interests of the mainland.

the second type is another extreme - the "faction shouting and killing". they will directly claim "leave the island but not the people" and "kill all the taiwanese". they oppose and deny the mainland's efforts to win over the centrists and expand the united front, and emphasize that unification does not require uniting all forces that can be united. they even emphasize that all taiwanese can be killed and then unification can be achieved, in order to crack down on the unification faction.

the third extreme is that because we pro-unificationists often say that at this stage we should first expand the alliance of non-green forces on the island of taiwan, we will be attacked by the internet army: you pro-unificationists are not true pro-unificationists at all, why do you want to unite other non-pro-unification forces on the island? you are simply "slow unification" and "fake unification", and you are "surrenderists".

"anonymous 64" national security department

in fact, the cyber army is not only very active in the issue of unification or independence, but also in the elections on the island, especially during the election of the leader of taiwan last year. at that time, the island had been hyping up the cooperation between the blue and white parties, because if the kuomintang did not cooperate with ke wenzhe's people's party, it would be impossible to defeat the democratic progressive party. therefore, we, the unification faction, hoped to find a way to pull the democratic progressive party down first, so that "taiwan independence" could not continue to stir up trouble, and to dampen the arrogance of extreme "taiwan independence". only in this way can we strive for more strategic opportunities and conditions for promoting mutual trust between the two sides of the taiwan strait.

but at this time, you will find many comments that look like they are from mainland netizens. they systematically and organizedly attack the blue-white cooperation: this is surrendering to ke wenzhe! ke wenzhe is from the dark green camp, how can there be a "blue-white cooperation"? the kuomintang should just elect its own candidates, and as long as they cooperate with the white camp, they are "independence" and so on.

the remarks of these people are very strange. they don't seem to consider at all how to bring the dpp down from power. they simply describe the kmt as the only politically correct one and they can only support the kmt. even when talking about the cooperation between the kmt and the people's party, they are immediately labeled.

recently, ke wenzhe was purged by the dpp. now should be the time for all opposition forces to unite and fight against the dpp. however, at this time, many mainland netizens who seem to support unification often appear on mainland social networking sites, constantly stirring up love and hatred between the blue camp and the white camp, and stirring up various grievances between the blue camp and ke wenzhe. some even pretend to be mainland netizens, attacking the "unificationists" for not being able to survive in taiwan, so they come to mainland websites to make comments, just to cheat money, food, drinks, etc.

this is strange, isn't it? in theory, now is the time to expand the patriotic unification forces, how could it turn into cynicism? humiliating the few remaining "unificationists" in taiwan in every possible way? but in fact, i am not surprised, because this is a systematic activity by taiwan's cyber army, deliberately impersonating mainland netizens to attack us.

guancha.com: some netizens have found that there are three types of cyber troops in taiwan: the first is the taiwan military's "communications and telecommunications command", the second is the taiwan pseudo-government's "digital development department", and the third is a large number of so-called communication companies in taiwan that specialize in bidding for pseudo-government projects. what are the functions of these three types of cyber troops, and what harm do they do to mainland china's cyberspace?

wang bingzhong:it should be said that the dpp authorities are really good at this. they will take the initiative to break up the cyber army and let them disperse in various public and private sectors. for example, the "anonymous 64" arrested this time is a cyber army directly placed by the dpp in the "information and communication military department" of the taiwan military. other cyber armies are placed in the propaganda department of the taiwan authorities and the dpp central party headquarters. these are all "open" cyber armies in public departments.

there are also some "hidden" cyber troops in the public sector. they hide in some departments that seem to have no connection with cyber troops, and use the budgets of different departments to support them. for example, the "1450" most often mentioned by mainland netizens comes from the fact that taiwan's agricultural department has allocated a budget of nt$14.5 million to promote agricultural policies for the agricultural department, but later it was discovered that it was actually using tax money to support the cyber troops who speak for the democratic progressive party.

the cyber army in the private sector is actually the green media and pro-dpp taiwanese media.

generally speaking, public sector cyber troops are easier to identify, while the strength of private sector cyber troops lies in the fact that their identities are more flexible. sometimes they can disguise themselves as civilians and implement the taiwan authorities' cyber army policies.

in the past, taiwan's cyber army mainly focused on domestic affairs, but now some of them have begun to get involved in cross-strait affairs. for example, taiwan's transportation and tourism departments have also hired some cyber army, using transportation and tourism as a cover to post on mainland weibo and toutiao to promote taiwan's tourism. among them are many posts praising taiwan's democratic system, freedom, and human rights, and slandering the mainland for having no freedom, etc. by praising how good taiwan is and how bad the mainland is, the spearhead is pointed directly at the mainland system, and such a tourism post has changed its flavor and become a political post.

the so-called "anonymous 64" this time mainly acts by inserting information that defames the mainland into relevant pages, which is relatively less harmful. the more harmful cyber army does not tell you on the surface that it is a cyber army system, but at a critical moment, it begins to uniformly insert some information that provokes cross-strait relations and defames the mainland system. this kind of cyber army lurking on various social platforms in the mainland is more harmful.

guanchazhe.com: from what you know, when did the dpp start to build a cyber army? why did they want to build a cyber army?

wang bingzhong:the dpp's cyber army has a long history. as early as the end of the last century, when the ptt forum and other college student bbs forums were established, the dpp established its own cyber army with the goal of helping with elections. for example, former dpp legislator kao chia-yu and other now famous people came from this group of cyber armies.

the cyber army at that time was not as flexible as it is now. it mainly organized people to defend the dpp's policies and debate with opponents on the bbs. around 2008, with the opening of the "three links" between the two sides of the taiwan strait, cross-strait interactions increased. the dpp cyber army began to shift from political offense and defense on the island to ideological confrontation with the mainland. at this time, some shadows of foreign forces had already participated in this project.

the most critical change occurred in the 2019 election. in order to get tsai ing-wen re-elected, the trump administration launched the so-called information war to catch the source of fake information. this allowed the local government of taiwan to use public funds to set up a cyber army, under the guise of protecting information security and defending democracy.

the so-called "communication and electronic warfare command" revealed this time was established under the banner of the united states' requirement to guard against false information. since then, the dpp's cyber army has become more and more "sophisticated."

with the rise of platforms like facebook, online debate platforms have transformed from forums to small circles and stratospheres. therefore, each cyber army has to operate several accounts and enter different communities. these cyber armies may talk about different interests at ordinary times, but once a key hot event occurs, they will flood different communities with the same information. this will give ordinary people an illusion that people in different circles are forwarding and discussing the same information, so this information must be true. this is the power of the dpp cyber army we see.

the 2019 hong kong riots evolved from the so-called "anti-extradition bill movement and anti-extradition bill amendment" to the "anti-one country, two systems, anti-unification, and anti-china" turmoil, and the shadow of taiwan's cyber army was indispensable. tsai ing-wen also relied on the cyber army to be re-elected. it can be said that that period was the peak of the proliferation of taiwan's cyber army.

taiwan keeps saying that the mainland has cyber armies and that the mainland is engaging in cognitive warfare. in fact, it is taiwan that supports the cyber army and engages in cognitive warfare.

observer.com: in recent years, mainland netizens have been using "1450" to refer to taiwan's cyber army, and have joked that whenever there is a power outage in taiwan, the hostility in the entire mainland cyberspace will be reduced a lot because there will be fewer people leading the trend. you just mentioned "1450", what do you think about this?

wang bingzhong:i think there is no smoke without fire, and people's intuition is usually sharp at the first moment, so the netizens' feelings are probably true. after all, only when this sign appears will everyone have a clear feeling.

sometimes we also find that after the election, the mainland social networking sites are relatively quiet for a while. the reason is actually very simple. after the election, the subsequent salaries of taiwan’s cyber soldiers may not be able to keep up for the time being, so after this stage of the task is completed, many cyber soldiers go home to rest.

in fact, we have heard that many political parties in taiwan have set up public relations companies and cyber armies. during the kmt election, they also hire public relations companies to support cyber armies. these cyber armies have a large budget during the election period, so the cyber army activities during this period will reach a climax, and will be relatively quiet for a period of time after the election.

so i think when mainland netizens mention power outages or periods without elections in taiwan, there seem to be fewer cyber troops, which is a pretty realistic reflection.

guancha.com: you mentioned earlier that as the sino-us confrontation intensifies, the us has also participated in the activities of taiwan's cyber army. can you explain the cooperation between the us and taiwan in this regard? how should the mainland respond?

wang bingzhong:the cooperation between the united states and taiwan is not a secretive one, but a very open one. in 2019, the so-called exchanges between the united states and the dpp authorities on jointly combating fake news broke out. at that time, the tsai ing-wen authorities directly invited people from the taiwan offices of companies including facebook, google, and youtube to attend a meeting. there must be instructions from the united states behind this. the two sides have cooperated in the past, but now the scope of cooperation has expanded from manipulating public opinion on the island to infiltration and "political warfare" in the mainland.

but what is more interesting is that many political pr companies in taiwan have begun to infiltrate the us elections. so you will see that the us election operations in recent years are sometimes very similar to those in taiwan. this is because there are a group of groups in taiwan that like to engage in political operations and are also highly active in the united states. the united states is also happy to accept these taiwanese people because the united states lacks people who understand chinese and chinese culture. it can be seen that whether it is information warfare, public opinion warfare or intelligence infiltration, the exchanges between the united states and taiwan will increase.

from tsai ing-wen to lai ching-te, the dpp has realized that pure "taiwan independence" is a dead end, and they want to align with western anti-china forces. in order to take the path of "internationalization of taiwan independence", they must deepen intelligence cooperation with the united states. an example is the recent pager explosion in lebanon, which was undoubtedly planned by israel, and the united states is behind israel. during last year's election, ko wen-je publicly revealed that there are several offices in taipei, which are bases for taiwan and israel to cooperate in training cyber troops.

screenshot of ke wenzhe's explosive video

in this way, the dpp authorities have made themselves a bridgehead for cooperating with the west in anti-china operations and public opinion intelligence operations. in the past, the mainland has never been accustomed to the practice of combining the public and private sectors of taiwan with the internet army, and the national security is not used to dealing with relatively flexible civilian forces. this has also given the island an opportunity to take advantage of, and to some extent has become a shortcoming of the mainland. if taiwan cannot be unified with the mainland, it will not only be a problem of unification, but will also become a bridgehead for the west to infiltrate the mainland, with great harm.

guancha.com: you mentioned that not only the democratic progressive party, but also the kuomintang and other political parties have their own cyber armies. now taiwan's politics seem to have entered a state of magical confrontation. has this seriously poisoned the political atmosphere on the island? what is the public's reaction to this?

wang bingzhong:in the early days, online political debates were relatively clean and honest. even if there was no real-name system, at least the person was real. we could make the truth clearer through debate. but now many accounts are fake, and the social account participating in the chat may just be one of the many accounts maintained by the cyber army. this means that we are not talking to a real, thoughtful person like in the past, and there is no reason to argue at all.

similarly, in the past, you could understand what people were thinking by observing the internet, but now online public opinion is likely to be created by money and computer programs. this has made the political atmosphere on the island very bad, and there is no way to really discuss an issue. the direction of public opinion is purely a competition of funds, shamelessness, and the reverse role-playing skills of the internet army. you can even deliberately pretend to have a different stance. anyway, you don’t have to be responsible for spreading rumors.

in the past, when we talked about election competition, we talked about right and wrong and let the people make a choice. now it is purely the result of capital controlling the election, because capital can control the internet army and let the internet army influence the election. even internet celebrities have become an important force in guiding elections on the island. for a while, it was so abnormal that blue and green politicians had to ask internet celebrities to watch their programs and even pay them to do interviews with them.

sometimes i find it strange that many of today's internet celebrities have no knowledge at all, no experience in politics, media and other related industries, and they are just paid to do things. but these internet celebrities can decide the results of elections, and even decide the fate of taiwan and the future development of the two sides of the taiwan strait. isn't this terrible? the words of so many scholars, experts, and politicians are not counted at all, and it is these internet celebrities and the internet army bought with money that decide our fate. taiwan's politics is really getting more and more corrupt.

observer.com: as the unification process progresses, we will certainly hope to eliminate the negative impact of taiwan’s cyber army on mainland online public opinion. what suggestions do you have for this?

wang bingzhong:i think we should distinguish right from wrong and be alert to extreme left and right remarks. whether it is the extreme "independence" that deliberately states that unification will harm the development of the mainland and opposes unification to the national rejuvenation and economic development we expect; or the other extreme "unification" that doesn't care about anything and just "keeps the island but not the people", we should be extremely vigilant.

furthermore, i hope that netizens can have some ability to distinguish and be vigilant against the extreme left, extreme right, traffic-grabbing and so-called "low-level red and high-level black". we must avoid the simple patriotic sentiment being led into some extreme hatred and confrontation scenes. we should also be careful not to use the so-called rationality of the overall situation to avoid the crackdown on "taiwan independence".

when we all have a basic sense of defense, i believe that no matter how these cyber troops try to reverse their roles or deliberately "carry the red flag to oppose the red flag", they will not succeed. if there is no basic ability to distinguish, no matter how we promote the real-name system or display ip addresses, the impact will still be limited.

at the same time, netizens should not rely too much on the words of invisible people. commentators in traditional media should shoulder more social responsibility and guide the public in the right direction.

finally, relevant official media and official departments in mainland china should also better understand how to use new media tools to restore order.