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3 taiwanese cyber soldiers revealed! the national security department uncovered the cognitive warfare unit of taiwan's "information and communications army". how should we respond?

2024-09-24

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yesterday, the national security department officially issued a document to expose a cognitive warfare organization under the taiwan military’s cyber warfare and cognitive warfare forces.

this is the first time that a branch of taiwan's cognitive warfare force has been exposed to everyone, and it has undoubtedly proved that the 1450 that has been circulating on the internet is not a joke made up by "little pinks", but a real cyber threat. therefore, let's say a few more words here.

taiwan military information communication military unit

first, we need to mention the taiwan military's information and communications military unit mentioned by the ministry of national security. the so-called information and communications military unit is officially called the taiwan ministry of national defense information and communications military command (icefcom). this command is directly under the taiwan military's "ministry of national defense" and its main tasks are network/information operations, cognitive/propaganda operations, and internal communication network management of the taiwan military.

after several adjustments, the unit was officially upgraded to a command-level unit on july 1, 2017, and its commander was changed from major general to lieutenant general. when the ict corps was established, tsai ing-wen, then leader of taiwan, issued a directive requiring the ict corps to "defend the digital homeland."

in may 2021, after taiwan revised the "organic act of the ministry of national defense", the information, communications and electronics command was further upgraded. it was originally under the jurisdiction of the general staff headquarters of the ministry of national defense and was under the jurisdiction of a deputy chief of staff in charge of communications and networks. it was changed to a military agency directly under the ministry of national defense. this shows that the taiwan military attaches great importance to the strategic position of this cyber warfare and information warfare force.

judging from the subordinate units of the information and communications technology army command, the command has two wing-level units and an electronic warfare center, namely the information and communications wing and the cyber ​​warfare wing, and each wing is led by a major general.

among them, the information and communication brigade is composed of 3 battalions and 2 operation teams according to the known organization. the 3 battalions are exactly one for each of the three combat zones of the taiwan army's main island. they are all reorganized and transferred from the information and electronic groups originally directly under the taiwan army's various corps. the 2 operation teams are mainly responsible for military communications on outer islands or outlying islands, including the hualien operation team and the kinmen operation team, which were reorganized and transferred from the previous hualien defense department's information and communication operation company and the kinmen defense department's information and communication operation company.

from the perspective of organization, the information and communications brigade should only be responsible for daily administrative management and organization of training functions, and the communication units, such support departments, should be transferred from various combat zones and defense commands to the management of the information and communications army command for the convenience of daily administrative management and unified training. in wartime, they should be reassigned to various combat zones and defense commands to assume the communication and signal functions at the combat zone and defense command level.

however, the cyber warfare wing is not the same. since cyber warfare offense and defense can be completed without being assigned to each combat zone, it has a high degree of centralization and unity. under centralized and unified command, it is convenient for administrative management and unified organization and implementation of cyber warfare offense and defense, achieving flat command and rapid response.

therefore, the cyber ​​warfare wing of the information and communications command is likely to be responsible for both administrative management and organizing cyber warfare offense and defense, as can be seen from the currently disclosed organization of the cyber ​​warfare wing of the information and communications command of the taiwan military. currently, we only know that the cyber ​​warfare wing has a command and protection brigade and a cyber warfare brigade under its jurisdiction, and the only unit below the brigade is the cyber ​​environment analysis center disclosed by the national security department.

anonymous 64

big ivan searched for a long time but couldn't find any other subordinate units of the wing, which proved that the taiwan military was still very secretive about some parts of the information and communications technology command.

however, judging from the cognitive warfare team consisting of only three people disclosed this time, big ivan tends to believe that the cyber warfare unit under the taiwan military information and communications command adopts a "cell"-like structure, with each "cell" responsible for operating one or a group of accounts.

these "cells" operate independently in normal times, and communicate horizontally when they need to be deployed in a concentrated manner, and forward messages to each other to form a joint force. this may be a more scientific and reasonable organizational structure for cognitive combat forces.

as for working methods and means, big ivan roughly understood the "anonymous-64" organization. how can we put it? we can only say that our national security department is probably still keeping its hands off and has not really touched too much on the real key points of the information and communications technology army command, or the aspects that are closely related to our vital interests and may have been seen by many people.

why do we say that? this "anonymous-64" seems to be just a small organization, as can be seen from its name. the reason why it is named "anonymous" is that big ivan believes that this is to take advantage of the popularity of another famous hacker organization "anonymous".

the "anonymous" organization first became famous in 2015. they posted a video on the foreign video platform "youtube", claiming to declare war on isis and launch an unprecedented hacker attack on isis, which made front-page headlines.

in fact, according to popular science from later generations, the "anonymous" organization has existed in the western world for many years. although on the surface it is a hacker alliance that claims to be relatively free and anarchist, from its actual behavior, the "anonymous" organization is not as absolutely neutral as it claims to be. it also has its own political attitudes and political tendencies.

but no matter what, taiwan's cyber army cognitive warfare unit "anonymous-64" has "anonymous" in its name, and its profile picture has the "v for vendetta" mask that is commonly used by anarchists. therefore, big ivan's basic judgment of "anonymous-64" is: a cognitive warfare unit that is riding on the popularity of "anonymous".

judging from the cognitive warfare content of this "anonymous-64", it is different from the common 1450. the main points are as follows:

first, its propaganda position is not in the mainland, but on overseas social media. however, judging from the fact that its propaganda language is simplified chinese, it does not seem to be propaganda to foreigners, nor does it seem to be propaganda to the older generation of overseas chinese who are accustomed to using traditional chinese characters. therefore, its main propaganda targets and news audiences seem to be the anti-traitors who like to "climb over the wall" to search for relevant information and the run people who have already walked to ding pangzi square. you and i are not its main propaganda audience;

second, its propaganda method is very simple and crude. big ivan roughly browsed the posts posted by this organization. it can only be said that they are basically some sensational rumors, without any arguments or evidence. the main theme is justification by faith - because you believe this, so what i say is true, and you believe it is true, then naturally i don’t need to prove it to you... it can be said that this is a station toilet tabloid in the cyber age. anyone with a little normal thinking ability will not pay attention to it;

third, the scale of this "anonymous" organization is not large. big ivan looked at its followers on social media. even though we have exposed its true colors, this account has only about 3,000 followers, and its posts have only dozens of comments and more than 100 favorites. on foreign social media full of traitors, this account is really small and its influence is not very high. even compared with some local accounts, it has no advantages and influence.

therefore, big ivan believes that the "anonymous-64" disclosed by the national security department this time may be just a trivial "cell" structure of the cyber warfare unit under the taiwan military's information and communication command, and it is a relatively poorly operated "cell" structure. judging from the fact that this group often makes false claims for military merits, it is possible that these taiwanese soldiers also cheat their superiors of funds from time to time.

how do you view this incident?

therefore, disclosing such a cognitive warfare group can deter taiwan’s cognitive warfare units, but it will not expand the influence too much and lead to things like “we are helping the other side to spread propaganda.” as big ivan said before, our national security department’s disclosure of the cognitive warfare unit under the taiwan military information communication command was obviously kept back by us. in a sense, it is a small view of the big, just a declaration to the outside world.

we know that you have such a cognitive warfare unit, and we also know what petty things you are doing. even if you are a very small "cell", you may not have direct contact with us, and the threat to us may not be as great as some local colonies or the people's congresses in ding pangzi square, we can still dig up your origins and reveal the evil spirits behind the account...

this will inevitably lead the taiwan military to think, if such a garbage unit can be exposed, how many of our cognitive warfare units have been exposed? are all units useless? servers must be replaced or personnel must be replaced on a large scale, etc. this kind of warning is what we want to achieve.

of course, the real online propaganda war and cognitive war are far more complicated and cruel than the cognitive war units disclosed by the national security department this time. judging from the cognitive war we have suffered in recent years, it can be said that the cognitive war strength of the other side is still quite strong. there are several key nodes in 2016, 2020, and 2022. the other side almost stepped on them accurately, and the cognitive war strategies they came up with had a very significant and subtle impact on us.

in recent years, the effects and harms of cognitive warfare propaganda implemented with the help of some key social events and sudden nodes are greater than we imagined. big ivan has been observing and collecting relevant information. in fact, we have been discussing cognitive warfare all the time. i hope to write a special article in the near future to explain to everyone how cognitive warfare is carried out.