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from entering the kursk region of russia to attacking the moscow refinery from a distance, the actions of ukrainian army chief silsky in the past month have impressed the ukrainian government and its supporters. however, on august 27 and september 1, silsky publicly stated that the strategic goal of the battle of kursk had not been achieved, and the more critical situation on the donetsk battlefield in eastern ukraine was becoming increasingly severe.

on august 29, due to the deteriorating situation on the front line, donetsk authorities forcibly evacuated some families. in pokrovsk, rescuers helped an old woman during the evacuation. photo/visual china

in short, silsky admitted that one of the purposes of the ukrainian army's attack on kursk was to contain the russian army's offensive against pokrovsk, the hub city of donetsk. but in fact, the russian army still kept its main attack force in donetsk, and even continued to increase its troops in the direction of pokrovsk regardless of the situation in kursk. as a result, by the beginning of september, the russian army's vanguard was less than 8 kilometers away from the pokrovsk border.

considering that the daily changes in the battle lines between russia and ukraine on the donetsk battlefield are counted in units of 100 meters or even 10 meters, silsky's remarks may be exaggerated in order to win more western aid. but it is undeniable that the progress of the ukrainian army in kursk has, to a certain extent, overshadowed the russian army's achievements in donetsk. the ukrainian mainstream media "kiev independent" wrote: "while the world saw the ukrainian army tearing up the russian flag in kursk, the russian flag was raised in one ukrainian settlement after another near donetsk."

if we extend the timeline, the changes in the battle lines become clearer: in february this year, after four months of fierce fighting, the russian army occupied avdeyevka, about 40 kilometers southeast of pokrovsk, and the ukrainian army's losses on the day of the withdrawal may have exceeded 1,500. in april, the russian army took advantage of the ukrainian army's poor coordination in the rotation of defense and occupied the ukrainian frontier town of ocheretine. in july, the ukrainian army abandoned the natural barrier of the vovcha river and evacuated westward.

from the perspective of the defenders, the situation in pokrovsk has not yet reached an irreversible point: the ukrainian army has deployed about five lines of defense, and the russian army has not yet controlled the important town of selidove on the south side of the offensive channel. therefore, the russian army has recently increased its forces, but has not chosen to continue to advance into pokrovsk. instead, it tried to resolve the threat from the flank first, and in turn gradually formed an encirclement of the main force of the defenders.

in general, there has been no dramatic change in the battle line in donetsk. the ukrainian defenders have used space and time to consume the russian army's fighting spirit and look for opportunities to counterattack. the russian army has gradually achieved the most basic goal of the "special military operation" set by putin in february 2022: to control the entire donetsk territory.

this slowly changing battle line in the stalemate reflects the competition of comprehensive national strength between the two sides and the resulting strategic adjustments after the war entered a long stage. according to ukrainian media reports, after the disastrous defeat in avdeyevka, there was a big disagreement within the ukrainian army on whether to defend a certain important town and fight hard. some frontline officers made it clear that if necessary in the future, the ukrainian army should decisively withdraw from pokrovsk. the important thing is not to let the experienced combat troops be annihilated by the russian army here.

for the russian army, the situation is just the opposite: if the ukrainian army's active forces cannot be destroyed, occupying more towns means a longer front line and more weak links, which will make it easier for the ukrainian army to find opportunities and launch small-scale counterattacks that are beneficial to public opinion and morale.

however, this is only based on the logic of "battlefield rationality". for the commanders of both russia and ukraine, they have an unavoidable political mission. if another major town in donetsk falls into the hands of the russian army, silsky's career may be over. a month ago, he risked throwing a "throwing knife" to kursk, which made the world pay attention to the russian-ukrainian battlefield again, and successfully maintained control over a small piece of russian land, but failed to change the deteriorating situation in donetsk. now he is aware of this key problem, but the ukrainian army and government have left him with few options for response.

author: cao ran

editor: xu fangqing