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as we all know, the 25th red army originated from the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area and was once part of the fourth red army. however, the 25th red army is still different from the fourth red army.

the long march of the 25th red army

because the red 25th army was reorganized by the red army troops that remained in the local base after the main force of the red fourth front army left the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area. therefore, although the red 25th army originated from the red fourth front army, it still has some differences from the main force of the red fourth front army. in october 1932, facing the fourth encirclement and suppression of chiang kai-shek's 300,000 heavy troops, the red fourth front army and the hubei-henan-anhui revolutionary base suffered heavy losses. under the situation that it was no longer able to break the enemy's encirclement and suppression, the headquarters of the red fourth front army made the decision to "leave the main force from the base and move westward to the pinghan road."

under this decision, the main force of the red fourth front army, including four divisions and a young communist international corps, totaling more than 20,000 people, left the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area and began the westward expedition, and finally arrived in northern sichuan and established the sichuan-shaanxi revolutionary base. it was after the establishment of the sichuan-shaanxi revolutionary base that the red fourth front army's military strength developed greatly. at that time, the main force of the red fourth front army that arrived in sichuan and shaanxi was only more than 15,000 people, but after only half a year, the red fourth front army expanded into five armies with more than 80,000 people.

sichuan-shaanxi soviet area

however, the departure of the main force of the red fourth front army also caused huge losses to the red army and revolutionary masses who stayed in the hubei-henan-anhui base area. after occupying the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, the kuomintang carried out a frantic encirclement and suppression of the remaining red army, and even more frantic destruction of the residents of the local base area, so the base area faced an unprecedentedly severe situation. under such circumstances, the red army that stayed in the base area reorganized the red 25th army under the leadership of the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee. at that time, the red 25th army was led by wu huanxian as the army commander and wang pingzhang as the political commissar. it had two divisions, 74 and 75, and a total of about 7,000 people.

however, the situation of the enemy being strong and we being weak did not change, and the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee at that time adopted a strategy of pure defense on the inner line against the kmt's attack, which ultimately led to the failure of the defense of the center of the base area, and the loss of more than half of the red 25th army. faced with the grim situation, the red 25th army changed its combat strategy and began to use guerrilla warfare to fight against the encirclement and suppression of the kmt army, and won many victories. during this period, the red 25th army and the red 28th army merged into the red 25th army, with xu haidong as the commander and wu huanxian as the political commissar.

xu haidong

however, even so, the situation of being outnumbered by the enemy remained unchanged, and the situation faced by the red 25th army was still grim. in addition, due to long-term combat and enemy sabotage, the food problem in the base area was very serious. therefore, in february 1934, the shanghai central committee of the communist party of china instructed the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area: the red army can be divided into two parts, one part is dispersed on the edge of the base area to conduct guerrilla warfare, and the other part of the main force completely leaves the base area to achieve the purpose of "retreating militarily to preserve cadres."

at this time, after receiving the report from cheng fangwu who had set out from hubei, henan and anhui to report on his work in the central soviet area and understanding the relevant situation in the hubei, henan and anhui soviet area, the central committee also gave the opinion of "supporting the transfer of the red army in the base area". in the autumn of 1934, at the repeated request of the hubei, henan and anhui provincial committee, the central committee of the communist party of china sent cheng zihua to the hubei, henan and anhui soviet area with central documents and instructions.

hubei-henan-anhui soviet area

after receiving the relevant instructions from the central committee, the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee held a meeting in huashanzhai, guangshan county on november 11, 1934. in addition to conveying zhou enlai's instructions, the meeting finally decided to concentrate most of the local armed forces and some cadres to accompany the provincial committee and the red 25th army to temporarily leave the base area and cross the pinghan road to the west to establish a new base area. the red 28th army and some cadres continued to carry out guerrilla warfare in the old base area. the red 28th army that remained was the main force of the 4th detachment of the new fourth army after the outbreak of the anti-japanese war.

on november 16, 1934, the red 25th army issued a departure declaration in the name of the second advance team of the chinese workers' and peasants' red army to the north to fight against japan, and set out from hejia chong in luoshan county to the west, officially starting the long march of the red 25th army. after the red 25th army set out, it was no surprise that the kuomintang once again mobilized more than 30 regiments of superior forces to encircle and intercept the red 25th army, trying to destroy this red army force. under a very serious situation, the red 25th army broke the enemy's blockade, crossed the funiushan mountains, experienced the extremely dangerous dushu town battle, and finally left henan and entered the southern part of shaanxi.

after entering southern shaanxi, the red army decided to establish a new base there because of the weak ruling power of the local kuomintang, the difficult living conditions of the masses, and the fact that the mountainous area was conducive to combat. it was also the hubei, henan and shaanxi bases established by the red army that not only did the red army not suffer huge losses during the long march, but it became the only one of the four long march teams whose strength increased instead of decreasing, creating a miracle that had never happened in the history of the red army's long march.

however, due to its weak foundation - the red 25th army had only more than 3,000 soldiers, after entering southern shaanxi, the red 25th army had been trying to establish contact with the red fourth front army. in fact, as early as 1932, after the main force of the red fourth front army left the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area and crossed the pinghan road, the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee had lost contact with the red fourth front army. moreover, when the main force of the red fourth front army left the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, it did not mean to leave forever, let alone abandon the base. the original plan was that the red fourth front army would fight back to the base.

wu huanxian, commander of the red 25th army

however, no one expected that due to changes in the enemy situation and the situation, the red fourth front army was ultimately unable to return to the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area. the red 25th army and the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee learned from newspapers that the red fourth front army had arrived in shaanxi. when the red 25th army left the hubei-henan-anhui base area and set out on the long march, and opened up the hubei-henan-shaanxi revolutionary base area at the junction of shaanxi, hubei, and henan, the former main force of the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, the red fourth front army, had already marched into sichuan and shaanxi for two years, not only opening up the sichuan-shaanxi soviet area, but also expanding its forces to more than 80,000 people.

in other words, the hubei-henan-shaanxi revolutionary base of the red 25th army was not far from the sichuan-shaanxi revolutionary base of the red fourth front army. the two red army teams both originated from the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, and had a very deep connection. under such circumstances, why did the red 25th army not contact the red fourth front army and join the sichuan-shaanxi soviet area, but eventually chose to go north to the shaanxi-northern soviet area where the environment was even more harsh?

in fact, the red 25th army did not give up contacting the red fourth front army. as early as february 1935, they sent people to deliver reports to the red fourth front army. however, it is not known whether the person sent had an accident or other situations occurred. the person sent never came back, and the red fourth front army did not move. in may, the red 25th army again sent a sichuanese who sympathized with the revolution to send a letter to the red fourth front army, but still received no reply. after the red 25th army set out on the long march, the red fourth front army had developed the sichuan-shaanxi soviet area into the second largest soviet area in the country at that time, and its troops had expanded to more than 80,000 people. its influence had long spread beyond the sichuan-shaanxi soviet area and spread across the country.

it is for this reason that, although they had long lost contact with the red fourth front army, the red 25th army and the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee still knew the location of the red fourth front army, and knew more about its development and growth. therefore, during the establishment of the hubei-henan-shaanxi revolutionary base, the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee and the leaders of the red 25th army had a heated discussion on whether to enter sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army. when the debate occurred, the red 25th army had just experienced the yujiahe battle, which was very fierce. although the red army won, it also suffered considerable casualties.

cheng zihua

moreover, since the red army officers and soldiers were used to charging ahead, the red army cadres suffered heavy casualties in this battle. therefore, after this battle, some leaders of the provincial party committee believed that the red 25th army was relatively weak and did not have the ability to establish a base alone, so they advocated entering sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army. moreover, regarding the border of southern shaanxi where they planned to establish a base, they believed that the southern shaanxi region had many mountains and little land, poor land, sparse population, and very scarce food production, making it unsuitable for establishing a base. these people's opinions were not unreasonable. moreover, the red 25th army itself came from the red fourth front army, and the two teams could be more easily integrated. even the kuomintang recognized this.

at that time, the kuomintang troops responsible for chasing and intercepting the red 25th army insisted that the red 25th army's goal was to enter sichuan. therefore, they stationed heavy troops in the direction that the red 25th army must pass through to enter sichuan. at the same time, the red fourth front army also knew the existence of the red 25th army, so the red fourth front army launched a special campaign in southern shaanxi, one of its purposes was to find the red 25th army. as for the source of the red fourth front army's information about the red 25th army, it was obtained from the kuomintang radio information: "it is estimated that xu haidong is looking for us, so we want to send some troops to meet him."

general xu haidong

since they all knew each other, why didn't they choose to enter sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army? first, the red fourth front army had already evacuated southern shaanxi and returned to sichuan. therefore, there are great risks in entering sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army at this time. on the one hand, the kuomintang army judged that the purpose of the red 25th army was to enter sichuan and join forces with the red fourth front army, so it had stationed heavy troops on the only way for the red 25th army to enter sichuan. at this time, the red 25th army left the soviet area and entered sichuan, which was bound to be a trap and extremely dangerous. on the other hand, the red 25th army's entry into sichuan inevitably meant abandoning the newly opened base in hubei, henan and shaanxi. abandoning the newly opened base and going to sichuan, where the future was uncertain, was extremely difficult, and naturally met with opposition from many people.

second, the red 25th army's stay in the hubei-henan-shaanxi soviet area could not only further recover and develop, but also play a role no less than entering sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army.

the hubei-henan-shaanxi revolutionary base is located between the northern shaanxi soviet area and the sichuan-shaanxi soviet area. therefore, establishing and developing a base here can not only strengthen itself, but also cooperate with the red fourth front army and the red 26th army in northern shaanxi. moreover, if the red 25th army, which is obsessed with the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, develops eastward, it may also restore the hubei-western, hubei-henan border, and hubei-henan-anhui soviet areas. this perfectly fits the idea of ​​the red 25th army soldiers who generally want to return to the old soviet area.

third, it has a lot to do with the complex feelings of the red 25th army and the red fourth front army. both the red 25th army and the red fourth front army originated from the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, and they were originally from the same source. however, due to the failure of the fourth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, the main force of the red fourth front army left the soviet area, causing huge losses to the soviet area and the local remaining troops. this made the red 25th army's perception of the red fourth front army extremely complicated. in addition to their affection for the red fourth front army, they also had a lot of resentment. they believed that it was because of the departure of the main force of the red fourth front army that the enemy easily occupied the base area, causing the revolutionary masses and the remaining troops to suffer heavy losses.

moreover, when the red fourth front army left, they did not even notify the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee. therefore, the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee was very dissatisfied with the departure of the main force of the red fourth front army and firmly opposed it. they regarded the main force of the red fourth front army leaving hubei-henan-anhui to establish a new soviet area in sichuan and shaanxi as a "evasion method" and a "escape."

therefore, the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee insisted that the red fourth front army's westward expedition was a "serious mistake." it was precisely because of this view that many people firmly opposed the idea of ​​entering sichuan to join the red fourth front army, although they had the same origin. cheng zihua, who insisted on entering sichuan at the time, was a latecomer and could not fully understand the special feelings of the red 25th army. therefore, he insisted on the red 25th army entering sichuan, and was therefore re-elected from the standing committee of the hubei-henan-anhui provincial committee.

fourth, it is also related to the deep feelings of the red 25th army for the hubei-henan-anhui base area. although they had to withdraw from the soviet area due to the heavy pressure of the enemy's encirclement and suppression, almost everyone had a very deep feeling for their hometown. even if they had to leave, in their minds it was only a temporary departure. the red 25th army was ready to fight back to the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area at any time if the situation changed.

the long march of the red army

if they chose to enter sichuan to join forces with the red fourth front army, it would mean that they had completely chosen to leave the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area, and the possibility of returning was very small. this was naturally opposed by most people.

fifth, it was related to the instructions of the central committee. cheng zihua entered the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area with the instructions of the central committee. at that time, the central committee’s instructions for the hubei-henan-anhui soviet area and the red 25th army were to establish a base area independently, and did not allow them to enter sichuan to join the red fourth front army. therefore, entering sichuan also violated the instructions of the central committee and was opposed by some people.

in july 1935, seven months after the red 25th army opened up the hubei-henan-shaanxi soviet area, the kuomintang finally reacted and began to gather heavy troops to encircle and suppress this red base. although the red 25th army had developed to a certain extent at this time, it had only established soviet areas and guerrilla areas in seven or eight counties and expanded the red army by more than 1,000 people. although there was considerable development, the military strength was still far behind that of the enemy.

in addition, the southern shaanxi soviet area was small and did not have the conditions to provide supplies to a large number of red army troops. therefore, after learning that there were also red army troops and bases in northern shaanxi, the main force of the red 25th army finally chose to go north to northern shaanxi to join forces with the red army in northern shaanxi as everyone was unwilling and it was difficult to enter sichuan.

after the 25th red army entered the northern shaanxi soviet area, it formed the 15th red army corps with the 26th and 27th red army, greatly expanding the northern shaanxi soviet area. the 25th red army also became the first red army team to reach northern shaanxi during the long march, objectively creating conditions for the party central committee and chairman mao to reach northern shaanxi during the long march.