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according to ukrainian media reports, the ukrainian donetsk mobile forces command blamed the karlivka defeat and losses on the soldiers and a commander of the 11th mobile infantry battalion of the 59th brigade!

according to deepstate,59th udi brigadesoldiers and officers of the 11th motorized rifle battalion contacted the media to complain that they were held responsible for the karlivka defeat by the command and that their commander had been fired.at that time, the unit was unable to resist because the russian army broke into its rear and surrounded the entire battalion.

at the same time, ironically, the brigade commander (a brigadier general) was publicly praised forthe 59th brigadeall defenses along the route of the division were lost within 36 hours, and novogrodievka within 3 days.

fired11 motorized infantry battalionthe battalion commander had just taken over the unit when it was in a state of collapse and, taking the right approach, managed to quickly restore the infantry and other services to normal work,the combat effectiveness of the 11th battalion began to increase.

on june 13, the unit moved to karlivka.

the natural front and coordinated work enabled the division to limit the advance of the russian troops at netaylovo and prevent them from entering karlivka.

meanwhile, fighting in the area was intense, with 150-200 mine and artillery strikes, 10-120 airdrops, and 10-30 fpv raids per day.

on august 22, a russian unit of 250 infantrymen equipped with a large number of artillery began a large-scale attack on the ukrainian 11th battalion front. from that day on, karlivka was subjected to an average of 200-500 artillery bombardments and long-range mines per day, up to 200 drone airdrops and 30-50 fpv attacks.

on august 22, the entire karlivka was under the full fire control of the ukrainian army. due to the danger of being surrounded, on august 24, the ukrainian army retreated under heavy artillery.

from august 22 to august 26, the battalion was still able to counterattack after suffering considerable losses, but from august 26 to 28, due to the collapse of the defenses near kalinovay, ptychy and memrik, russian troops entered the rear of the battalion from the west of karlivka. in addition, the russians entered halytsynivka.

by august 24, it was impossible to evacuate the wounded of the ukrainian army, the ammunition was at its lowest level, and the supply was insufficient. about 10-30 82+120+122+155+rszv shells were fired every day.

on august 26, the karlov pocket was formed.

near kharyznivka, the russian army occupied some trenches, but due to the lack of manpower of the ukrainian army, these trenches were completely unguarded.

based on the above conditions, after suffering heavy triple-digit casualties, the 11th battalion decided to withdraw the remnants of the battalion from the trenches to the border south of karlivka.

in fact, this decision played a decisive role in making the battalion bear the blame for the defeat of the entire front. the 10th battalion, located in the suburb of nevelsky, was in a similar situation, as the russians were already 10-12 kilometers behind them.

in the attack and siege of karlivka, at least 1,000 russian troops took part in the offensive, including the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 114th brigade, the 1454th battalion, the 60th brigade, the rocket artillery units of the 110th brigade and the msb.

in this situation, the ukrainian military command decided to remove the commander of the 11th battalion and try to preventthe fall of karlivka.howeversuch a decision caused low morale and disorganization among the entire battalion.

then the village collapsed directly!