the party committee of a brigade of the 71st group army improves its war planning and research capabilities through in-depth research
2024-09-03
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drone reconnaissance and harassment, helicopter low-altitude penetration, cruise missile covert raids... not long ago, a real-combat confrontation training of a brigade of the 71st group army kicked off at a certain mission point.
the reporter saw at the training site that as the "enemy situation" and battlefield situation continued to change, the on-site commander, captain gao of a certain battalion, sometimes commanded the various firepower units to establish dense firepower networks while maneuvering, and sometimes adopted tactics such as "silent entrapment" to wait for the target to enter the range before starting the search and attack, and finally "countered each move with a countermove" and led the officers and soldiers to complete the combat mission.
walking off the training ground, captain gao told reporters that the ability to innovate and develop these tactics was due to the brigade party committee's coordinated efforts to plan and research operations, conduct in-depth frontline research and evaluation, and promote innovation in the troops' tactics with innovative thinking, actual combat standards, and a pragmatic style.
in recent years, as air defense operations have been evolving towards informatization and intelligence, the combat styles of combat opponents have become increasingly diverse. last year, during a major mission, the firepower unit found that in response to multi-means, multi-dimensional, and multi-angle saturation attacks, previous tactics had problems such as overly complex command processes, overly simple firepower configurations, and insufficient firepower coordination. however, since these problems involve all aspects of training and preparation, the ability of battalions and companies to innovate and train tactics is limited, which restricts the overall improvement of the combat effectiveness of the troops.
"preparing for war is the brigade party committee's top priority, and it is our duty to innovate tactics to win on the battlefield." at the brigade party committee's meeting on war and training, a group of people took the initiative to take responsibility in combination with the research on the contradictions and difficulties reported by the grassroots. they divided the more than 20 difficulties and bottlenecks in the innovation of tactics raised by the grassroots, distinguished between command coordination, reconnaissance and interference, support and guarantee, and combat political work, and divided the work one by one. everyone received tasks and topics.
afterwards, the members of the party committee combined the on-site construction with the grassroots work and led the relevant personnel of the organization to conduct a comprehensive investigation and research at the front line. they sorted and analyzed the training data, observed and discussed the actual training, and systematically simulated the operation of tactics... the brigade leaders led the grassroots officers and soldiers to carefully screen the data one by one, repeatedly judge the video frame by frame, and verify each link. during the investigation, they also successively carried out the "i contribute a strategy for tactics" research activities, invited experts from colleges and universities to give lectures, and exchanged experiences with officers and soldiers of friendly units.
after in-depth research, seven research reports were brought to the party committee's war and training meeting for discussion. after several rounds of heated theoretical research, feasibility discussions, and multiple considerations, they finally explored and summarized three sets of new tactics that are more suitable for future battlefields.
promote from top to bottom and improve from bottom to top. in order to verify the actual combat quality and effectiveness of the innovative tactics, several members of the brigade party committee went to the front line of the mission again for investigation and inspection. they adopted the "task-based command" model, allowing commanders below the company level to independently judge the "enemy situation", independently choose tactics, and independently command shooting in the mission area. the "task-based command list" containing more than 20 types of typical combat opponent response processes has been further improved.
the party committee took the lead in developing tactics, which gave officers and soldiers motivation to train. now, commanders at all levels of the brigade have more options when dealing with various targets and air situations, and the efficiency and success rate of air defense operations are constantly improving.
after the most recent training session, the reporter saw that the officers and soldiers struck while the iron was hot, conducted a review and summary on the spot, analyzed and found deficiencies, studied and analyzed the causes, and put forward opinions and suggestions on upgrading and improving tactics based on the latest training data. (zhou wei and gao junfeng)
source: china military network
